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The purpose of this paper is to make suggestions as to how Aboriginal self-
government could be implemented without any amendment ofthe Constitution of
Canada. The authors suggest that elements ofthe Charlottetown Constitutional
Accordcould be includedinapolitical accordoraccords, which could become the
frameworkfor self-government negotiations. The authors discuss the nature ofthe
powers that could be included in a self-government agreement, making extensive
reference to the Yukon First Nation Self-GovernmentAgreements . The issues that
are examined include personal and territorial jurisdictions, concurrent and
exclusivepowers, the relationship ofAboriginal laws tofederalandprovincial (or
territorial) laws, theadministration ofjusticeandthefnancingofself-government.
Theauthors recommendthatself-governmentagreementsshouldbeconstitutionally
protected, and they explain how that can be accomplished under the existing
Constitution . The applicability of the Charter ofRights is also discussed, and a
recommendation is madefor the development ofAboriginal constitutions, which
could include Aboriginal Charters ofRights.
Le but de cet article est d'apporter des suggestions, afin de savoir comment
l'autonomie autochtonepourraitêtre implantée sansamendementdelaConstitution
du Canada. Les auteurs suggèrent qu'une part de l'accord constitutionnel de
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Charlottetownpourraitêtreinclusedansunouplusieursaccordspolitiques, cequi
deviendrait le cadre des négociations surl'autonomie. Les auteursdiscutent de la
nature des pouvoirs qui pourraient être incluse dans l'accord sur l'autonomie,
faisant largement référence à l'accord sur l'autonomie de la Première Nation du
Yukon . Les sujets quisont examinés comprennent les juridictions personnelles et
territoriales, les pouvoirs concordants et exclusifs, la relation entre les lois
autochtones et les loisfédérales etprovinciales (ou territoriales), l'administration
de lajustice et lefinancement de l'autonomie. Les auteurs recommandent que les
accords sur l'autonomie soient constitutionnellement protégés, et ils expliquent
comment cela pourrait être accompli dans le cadre de la constitution actuelle.
L'application de la Charte desdroitsestaussidiscutée, et une recommandation est
formulée pour le développement de constitutions autochtones qui pourraient
inclure des Chartes des droits autochtones.
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Implementing Aboriginal Self-Government 189
Introduction
Since the failure ofthe Charlottetown Accord' in October 1992, there has been
uncertainty about the future ofAboriginal self-governmentandparticularly the
implementationofthe Aboriginalpartoftheproposed constitutional amendments .
It appears that constitutional reform is not on the national agenda in the wake
of the `No' vote . While many negotiations are under way between various
Aboriginalpeopleszand Canadian governmentsonissues ranging fromcriminal
justice to land claims, the constitutional import of any agreements produced is
unclear. Aboriginal peoples have repeatedly expressed their frustration withthe
premises, scope and the pace of present negotiations and the limited progress
suggests that a fundamental rethinking of government policy and practice is in
order.
TheRoyal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples' discussion paper, Partners
in Confederation, 3 provided clarification of the source and some ideas for the
implementation oftheright of self-government. Moreover, the election in 1993
of a Liberal federal government, whose policies included the commitment to
recognize the inherent right to self-government and implement it without re-
opening constitutional discussions, suggests that a new political climate exists4
Thepurpose ofthis article is to explore the extent to which progress can be
made immediately, within the existing Constitution of Canada, on the
implementation of the inherent right of self-government. We do not consider
arguments outside the Constitution of Canada in this paper, although we
acknowledge thatfull political consideration of selfgovernmentwouldinvolve
exploring such arguments.' In particular, we want to analyze the legal and
constitutional issues involved in the implementation of the inherent right
without the express constitutional amendments proposed by the Charlottetown
Accord . Theseinclude the articulation ofAboriginalgovernmentaljurisdictions
in light of existing federal and provincial laws of general application; the
1 The references in the paper are all to the Consensus Report on the Constitution of
August 28, 1992 (Ottawa : Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, 1992)
(hereafter referred to as the "Consensus Report"] .
'We use the expression "Aboriginal peoples" to refer to First Nations (Indian), Inuit
and Métis peoples collectively . When specific reference is made to negotiations or
agreements the more specific terminology is employed .
s Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal
Peoples, Self-Governmentand the Constitution (Ottawa: The Commission, 1993) .
4 October 8, 1993statementofLiberalleaderdean Chrétien inSaskatoon, Saskatchewan
whenhe unveiled the Aboriginal PlatformoftheLiberal Party ofCanada. TheLiberalParty
platform, called `the red book' (Liberal Party of Canada, Creating Opportunity, (1993) at
2), contains several critical policy commitments, including a commitment that "The
Liberal government will actonthepremise that the inherent rightof self-governmentis an
existing Aboriginal and treaty right within the meaning of section 35 ofthe Constitution
Act, 1982" .
'Forexample, we do not consider argumentsrooted in Aboriginal peoples' nation-to-
nation relationship with the Crown or Aboriginal law and spirituality or the international
legal arguments on self-determination .
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financing of self-government; the constitutional status of self-government
agreements ; the resolution ofdisputes over inconsistent (Aboriginal andfederal
or provincial) laws ; and the application of the Canadian Charter ofRights and
Freedoms to Aboriginal governments.
The Charlottetown Accord expressly recognized an "inherent" right of
Aboriginal self-government.' This is important from both a political and legal
perspective. The right ofself-government wasunderstood in the Charlottetown
negotiations to be a pre-existing rightrooted in Aboriginal peoples' occupation
and government of this land prior to European settlement. This is not a new
concept. Although Canadian courts have not explicitly recognized the inherent
rightofself-government(because they havenotyetbeen faced squarely with the
issue), the courts have recognized other Aboriginal rights. TheSupreme Court
of Canada has accepted that these rights derive from the fact that Aboriginal
peoples have existed in Canada for a very long time and have exercised rights
which must be respected by more recent immigrants .' As Professor Brian
Slattery has shown, Aboriginal rights are rights that are held by Aboriginal
peoples, notby virtueofCrowngrant, legislation ortreaty, but "by reason ofthe
fact that aboriginal peoples were once independent, self-governing entities in
possession of most of the lands now making up Canada".' This logic supports
the fact that the rights which Aboriginal peoples enjoy in Canadian law are
inherent to their ownhistory and experience as the first peoples. Many treaties
concluded between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown also demonstrate that
Aboriginal peoples exercised their rights of self-government by structuring
their relations with governments in Canada on the basis of consent and mutual
recognition.
The inherent nature of the right of self-government does not answer the
question of what the right means today, and how it relates to the existing
constitutional andpolitical structures . Uncertainties on these issues make high
level political discussions on what Aboriginal self-government means in a
contemporary political context essential, because at present the issues are wide
open to judicial interpretation if left to the courts, and they are not suitable for
resolution by courts . 9 It is in the best interests of both governments and
Aboriginal peoples to explore options short of constitutional amendment
6 Consensus Report, supra footnote 1 at 12 .
' R. v. Sparrow, [199011 S.C.R . 1075 . In this case, Dickson C.J . and La Forest J.,
writing for a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, expressly recognized the right of a
member of the Musqueam Indian band to fish for salmon in the Fraser River "where his
ancestors had fished from time immemorial".
IB. Slattery, "The Constitutional GuaranteeofAboriginal andTreaty Rights" (1983)
8Queen's L.J . 232 at242. SeealsoB. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987)
66 Can. Bar Rev. 314.
9Theissues arenot suitable forresolutionby courts because only politicaldiscussions
canadequately addressmatters ofjurisdiction, financing andintergovernmental cooperation.
Legal reasoning in the constitutional context is not broad enough to embrace all ofthese
dimensions .
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(although constitutional amendment would be the preferred approach) . 1 ° What
other approaches are there andhow would they be viewed from aconstitutional
law standpoint? Answering this question is the purpose of our paper: we want
to explore ways to move ahead on Aboriginal self-governmentin apeacefuland
constitutional fashion . Several approaches to the issue ofjurisdiction, status of
agreements and justiciability will be explored in the pages to follow . The
political feasibility of the ideas developed herein is for elected officials to
evaluate : we are simply trying to suggest what is legally possible under the
present Constitution .
The Charlottetown Accordprovided amechanism for defining the scope of
self-government rights for particular Aboriginal peoples . It also implied that
Aboriginal governmentswould be equivalentinstatus to theexisting two orders
of government inCanada bydescribingAboriginal governments as one ofthree
orders ofgovernment;' I in otherwords, Aboriginalgovernments were tobe seen
as sovereign in their own spheres . The Accord was not specific on many
important points : it called for (in another draft accord) a process to work out
problems which could arise in negotiations andjurisdictional conflicts . It also
provided for a gradual transition to self-government based on negotiated
agreements, delay in justiciability of the inherent right, and rules for dealing
with inconsistent laws. It is fair to say that, while the recognition of an inherent
right ofself-government was animportant feature ofthe CharlottetownAccord,
what was far more significant, from a practical perspective; was the method
proposed to invigorate the right . Although the negotiation of self-government
agreements has-been on the national agenda since the early 1980s, the Accord
for the first time would have established a firm legal and policy framework to
govern negotiations, to resolve preliminary issues such as identification of
parties, to clarify the scope of Aboriginal jurisdiction, 12 to ensure adequate
funding for theprocess andforthe resultinggovernments, and to provide for the
constitutionalization of the self-government agreements and for their
implementation . In our view, this comprehensive structure, which was agreed
toby all governments, was the trulyinnovative feature ofthe Accord, and which
can be built upon.
1 ° In our view, comprehensive constitutional amendments on Aboriginal self-
government would be the preferred approach because they would assist in clarifying the
status and nature of Aboriginal governments in light of the already defined federal and
provincial jurisdictional structure of Canadian federation . Moreover, comprehensive
constitutional amendments would ensure that Aboriginal government jurisdiction not be
"inferior" in status to the existing two orders ofgovernment, which already have a secure
constitutional footing with established rules for the resolution ofjurisdictional conflicts .
This is not to say that the courts would not support exclusive Aboriginal jurisdiction over
certain subjectmatters without constitutional reforms, butthatcomprehensive amendments
would save resources on litigation and acrimonious jurisdictional conflicts .
11 Consensus Report, supra footnote 1 at 12 .
12 The Accordincludedprovisions allowing forAboriginal peoples who already have
treaties with the Crown to elect a treaty review/renovation process as a vehicle for the
implementation of their inherent right of self-government .
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The provisions of the Charlottetown Accord are critical, because the
conventional body ofconstitutional law inCanada is noteasily squared with the
inherent right of Aboriginal self-government. There are many foundational
notions in constitutional law which are inconsistent with the recognition of
Aboriginal self-government . Principal among these is the doctrine of
exhaustiveness, which suggests that all available jurisdiction in Canada is
currently divided between the federal and provincial governments by sections
91 and 92 (and the other jurisdictional provisions) of the Constitution Act,
1867 . 13 This doctrine appears to leave no room for Aboriginal self-government
except as a delegated government under the federal or provincial division of
legislative and administrative responsibility . Of course, the doctrine of
exhaustiveness was developed without regard for the Aboriginal reality in
Canada and, asthe RoyalCommission on AboriginalPeopleshas suggested,the
doctrine of exhaustiveness may go to the scope of jurisdiction and not the
exclusiveness ofjurisdiction . 14Moreover, the doctrine developed in thecontext
offederal-provincialjurisdictional disputesin whichAboriginal peoplesplayed
no role.
The doctrine ofexhaustiveness was also developed before section 35 ofthe
Constitution Act, 1982 was introduced into the Canadian Constitution to give
more explicit constitutional protection to Aboriginal and treaty rights .
Constitutional lawyers and elected officials must review such doctrines that
reflecttheEurocentric bias ofCanadian constitutional law andgovernment, and
reorder institutions and doctrine so to give full expression to the longstanding
Aboriginal presence in Canada. This review will become more urgent as the
implementation ofself-governmentprogresses. Thedoctrineofexhaustiveness
should not be an obstacle in the way of articulating Aboriginal government
jurisdiction . It is a matter that requires discussion, but it is not fatal to the
implementationofself-governmentwithin theexisting constitutional framework.
1. Expressing Aboriginal Self-Government Jurisdiction
A . Contextual Statement
Beyond the recognition of an inherent right of self-government, the
implementation of the right in the particular context ofan Aboriginal people is
a more complex legal challenge. There are different Aboriginal peoples with
diverse government traditions, territories and aspirations. A flexible approach
is required to respond to these various situations . The Charlottetown Accord
provided for a flexiblemethod ofexpressingthe scopeofaboriginaljurisdiction
which isworth examining closely,becauseitis ahelpfulmiddle ground between
two extremes . At one extreme is the simple recognition of the inherent right
"This principle was articulated in A .G. Ont. v.A.G. Can. (ReferenceAppeal), [1912)
A.C. 571 at 583, in which the Judicial Committee ofthe Privy Council said that "whatever
belongs to self-government in Canada belongs either to the Dominion or to the provinces,
within the limits of the British North America Act" .
t4 Partners in Confederation, supra footnote 3 at 32 .
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without any guiding frameworkforimplementation . This approachisbroad and
vague enough torespondto the diverse situations and aspirations of Aboriginal
peoples, but its very breadth and vagueness makes concrete implementation
more difficult . At the other extreme is a detailed blueprint for self-government
that would apply to all Aboriginal governments without regard for their
differing situations, cultures and aspirations .
The Charlottetown Accord proposed that a "contextual statement" should
form part of the Aboriginal Self-government package of constitutional
amendments . Theideaofthecontextual statementwas to frame self-government
jurisdiction in light of the purposes and objectives that should be served by the
inherent right . It was designed to be flexible enough to accommodate different
circumstances and conditions, and yet detailed enough to indicate the general
scope of self-government . The text of the proposed contextual statement is
worth recalling in full, although we note that no final legal text was ratified:
The exercise of the right of self-government includes the authority of the duly
constitutedlegislative bodiesofAboriginal peoples, eachwithinits ownjurisdiction : 1 s
(a) to safeguard and develop their languages, cultures, economies, identities,
institutions and traditions ; and,
(b) to develop, maintainand strengthen theirrelationship with theirlands, waters and
environment
so as to determine and control their development as peoples according to their own
values and priorities and ensure the integrity of their societies. 's .
The contextual statement describes the purposes of self-government and the
general functions of Aboriginal legislative bodies and, since it has been agreed
to by governments and Aboriginal organizations, it remains relevant in setting
the generalpurpose or contextfor self-government negotiations . The statement
emphasises the authority of Aboriginal govermnents to enact and enforce laws
which will enable Aboriginal peoples to control their own development as
peoples, to set priorities to ensure the development of their members, and to
protect their lands, languages and cultures .
One issue not explicitly mentioned in the contextual statement is the
objective of self-government implementationforthose Aboriginalpeopleswith
treaties . Many First Nations leaders speak of"treaty government", and suggest
that their treaties are an effective vehicle forthe implementationofthe inherent
right of self-government . Confusion over the relationship between treaties and
the package of self-government amendments in the Charlottetown Accord was
a source of dissension during the debate over the Accord in Aboriginal
communities. Clarification on this point is required . As the President of the
Union ofNovaScotiaIndians suggestedto the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples :
's The expression "each within its own jurisdiction" was added to make it clear that
an Aboriginal governmentwillexercise its authoritywithinitsjurisdiction . In ouropinion,
this is redundant and could be eliminated without taking away from the meaning of the
statement .
16 Consensus Report, supra footnote 1 at 17 .
194
	
LA REVUEDU BARREAU CANADIEN [Vol.74
We see our right of self-government as an inherent right which does not come from
other governments . It does not originate in ourTreaties. The right ofself-government
andself-determination comes fromtheMi'kmaqpeople-it isthrough theirauthority
thatwe govern . The Treaties reflect the Crown'srecognition that we were, and would
remain, self-governing, but they did not create our Nationhood . . . In this light, the
treaties should be effective vehicles for the implementation of our constitutionally-
protected righttoexercisejurisdiction andauthority asgovernments . Self-government
can start with a process of interpreting and fully implementing the 1752 Treaty, to
build on it to an understanding of the political relationship between the Mi'kmaq
people and the Crown."
Treaty implementation wasdealt with in a separate sectionofthe Charlottetown
Accord," although the relationship between treaty implementation and self-
government implementation was not clearly linked. For some Aboriginal
peoples, the implementation of the inherent right of self-government is
inseparably linked to the fulfilment of a pre-existing treaty relationship.
We suggest thatarevised version ofthe contextual statement shouldreflect
the central role oftreaties andtreaty-based government forTreaty First Nations.
This could be accomplished by adding to the concluding language of the
contextual statement some additional language such as the following: " . . . and
recognizing thatforTreaty FirstNationstheimplementation ofself-government
will mean the articulation of rights and responsibilities flowing from existing
treaties, which should be fully honoured and implemented by Canadian
governments as a central part of self-government implementation ."
Thetext ofthecontextual statement contemplates thatthe "duly constituted
legislativebodies" canact toachievecertain aims and objectives . Therequirement
of duly constituted legislative bodies would require the Aboriginal people in
question to develop a constitution with provision for a law-making body and
demonstrated support among the people for this institution. 19 While it is
presumed that such a constitution would be written, it could also take another
form more consistentwith Aboriginal customs andtraditions ifsodesiredbythe
particular Aboriginal people . For example, in the Iroquoian nation, wampum
belts maybe usedto articulate theconstitution andtherespectiveresponsibilities
of legislative and other government bodies .
The aims the Aboriginal legislative body would pursue are defined by the
contextual statement in subsections (a) and (b), and especiallyin the concluding
clause, where the overall objective is that of determining and controlling the
particular people's development according to their own values and priorities
and in order to ensure the integrity of their society . This statement marks a
dramatic break with the status quo of delegated and limited power under the
Indian Act or other statutory schemes affecting Aboriginal peoples . The
17 Union of Nova Scotia Indians, 1992 . Alex Christmas (Address to the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 6 May 1993 at Eskasoni, Nova Scotia) .
'$ Consensus Report, supra footnote 1 at 13 .
cv The contextual statement does not impose a certain political structure. This is an
internal matter for Aboriginal peoples to determine and, once agreed upon internally, to
demonstrate community support for the institutions and structures of government.
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statement confirms the universal viewthatthe IndianActmustbe abandoned in
favour of a relationship based on internal self-determination .
It was never imagined that the contextual statement would definitively
settle thepowers ofanAboriginal government, orthat itwouldresolve conflicts
between Aboriginal laws and other laws . What the clause would do is to offer
a broader prism through which to view the discussions on self-government
between individual Aboriginal communities and governments that would
resolve matters ofjurisdiction . It is the foundation upon which a list of powers
canbe developedby aparticularAboriginalpeople and an agreementnegotiated
with government to clarify jurisdiction and fiscal responsibility.
B . Optionsfora new Contextual Statement
Becauseofthefailureofthe CharlottetownAccord, thecontextual statement
did not make its way into the Constitution, and it is only realistic to recognize
that constitutional amendments on self-government are unlikely in the near
future. Nonetheless, language close to the contextual statement could still
provide the framework for progress on the development of self-government
institutions . Forexample,thereis nothingtopreventthe Aboriginal organizations
andthe federal andprovincial governments fromentering into apolitical accord
or accords on aframework for the implementation ofthe, inherent right ofself-
government.
In addition to the option of a political accord, Aboriginal peoples and
governments may explore the option of federal legislation to provide such a
framework . Provided suchlegislationis the product ofconsent on thepart ofthe
Aboriginal peoples and their representatives, this option would enable the
development of specific political accords with Aboriginalpeople and allow for
flexibility inaccommodating the differences in the circumstances and priorities
of Aboriginal peoples. One advantage of legislation is that it would be cost-
efficient andexpeditious ratherthannegotiating separate political accords on all
frameworkissues with eachAboriginal people concerned . The legislationcould
establishbasic principles whichcouldthenbeparticularizedin specific accords.
Either through political accords or legislation, a reworked contextual
statement could form a central component of a framework for implementation
of the inherent right of self-government. We would suggest the following text
for inclusion in a political accord or legislation:
The exercise of the right of self-government includes the authority of the duly
constituted legislative bodies of Aboriginal peoples:
(a) to safeguardanddeveloptheirlanguages,cultures, economies, identities,institutions
and traditions ; and
(b) to develop, maintain and strengthen their relationship with their lands, waters
and environment
so as to determine and control their development as peoples according to their own
values andpriorities and ensure theintegrity oftheir societies andrecognizing that for
Treaty FirstNations theimplementationofself-governmentwillrequirethe articulation
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of rights and responsibilities flowing from existing treaties, which should be fully
honoured and implemented by Canadian governments.
C . Processfor Negotiating Agreements
The goal of a political accord or other framework for the implementation
of the inherent right of self-government has to be the conclusion of negotiated
agreements with particular First Nations, Inuit and M6tis peoples on self
government jurisdiction, financing, and dispute resolution . We have a strong
preference for a revived political framework leading to negotiated agreements .
The alternative ofinaction by governments would lead to unilateral initiatives
by Aboriginal peoples, which would give rise to legal disputes, the resolution
ofwhich would be highly unpredictable. 2°In ourview, an agreed-uponcontextual
statement would help to facilitate self-government agreements, because it
provides the objectives ofself-governmentwhich should guide thenegotiations
and the content of any agreement.
Any self-governmentagreementbetween aspecificAboriginalcommunity
and government(s) will of necessity include a list or lists of different heads of
powers under which the Aboriginal government would have the discretion to
legislate . Moreover, any list ofpowers shouldrelate to the contextual statement
and be interpreted inlight ofits objectives to facilitate the implementationofthe
right of self-government . The contextual statement would not be the only guide
to the development of heads oflegislative power or the only interpretative aid.
In the case ofTreaty FirstNations, forexample, there maybe treaty rights which
would carry with them somejurisdictional responsibility ." Modern land claims
agreements will also contain powers ofmanagement ofthe lands and resources
belonging to an Aboriginal people.
II . Scope ofAboriginal Jurisdiction
In this essay, wemakefrequentreference tothe YukonIndian Self-Government
Agreements?' The Yukon Agreements are helpful because they illustrate the
progress which is possible withinthe existing constitutional framework as well
2° We do not mean to suggest that Aboriginal governments must wait for the
conclusion of agreements in order to exercise jurisdiction . The Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples has already accepted this point in Partners in Confederation, supra
footnote 3 at 36 where it was recognized thatAboriginal peoples could move immediately
in areas of core jurisdiction without negotiated agreements. We do not doubt that this is
the case as a matter ofconstitutional law. However, the path of negotiation is the path of
social peace as well as thepath which will not divert resources to the courts over abstract
and complex legal battles .
21 Forexample, Treaty 6 requires the Chiefs to maintain peace andorder among their
people and in the dealings oftheirpeople with non-Indians. To implement this agreement
one would imagine jurisdiction over the administration ofjustice would be required .
'2 There are four self-government agreements : The Champagne and Aishihik First
Nations Self-GovemmentAgreement;theFirstNationofNacho Nyak DunSelf-Government
Agreement ; the Teslin Tlingit Council Self-Government Agreement and the Vuntut
Gwichin Self-Government Agreement. All four Agreements were signed in Whitehorse
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as the need for reconsideration of certain government policies and approaches
which impede the implementation of self-government." To understand those
Agreements some background is necessary .
TheCouncilforYukon Indians, whichrepresents the fourteenFirst Nations
in the Yukon, has entered into an "Umbrella Final Agreement" with the
Government of Canada and the Yukon.' This Agreement contains the basic
terms of the Yukon land claims settlement, but it is not a "land claims
agreement" within the meaning of section 35 ofthe Constitution Act, 1982, and
it is not legally effective unless and until its provisions are incorporated into a
Final Agreement entered into by aYukonFirst Nation . Four First Nationshave
enteredinto Final Agreements which incorporate all theterms ofthe Umbrella
Final Agreement, and also containprovisions specificto the FirstNation . These
four Final Agreements are "land claims agreements".
The Umbrella Final Agreement, and therefore all four First Nation Final
Agreements, contemplated the negotiation of self-government agreements by
the Yukon First Nations. However, at the insistence of the Government of
Canada, the Umbrella Final Agreement and the four First Nation Final
Agreements provided, by paragraph 24.12.1, that self-government agreements
would not create "treaty rights" within section 35 ofthe Constitution Act, 1982 .
The four Yukon First Nations that have entered into First Nation Final
Agreements have also entered into Self-Government Agreements . The Self-
GovernmentAgreements are very similarto eachother, being based on aModel
Agreement negotiated by the Council for Yukon Indians in 1992. The four
Agreements are given effect by self-government legislation enacted by the
Parliament of Canada and the YukonTerritorial Assembly."
Thejurisdictional provisions of one of the Yukon Indian Self-Government
Agreements are reproduced as an appendix to this article. The jurisdictional
provisions are set out in four lists ofpowersto enactlaws . The firstlist (in para .
13.1) is a listoflaw-making powersthatare"exclusive"tothe FirstNation. (The
other law-making powers are concurrent. Theterms exclusive and concurrent
on May 29, 1993, and all four have been published under the authority of the Minister of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, by Supply and Services Canada, under the
above names.
23 Another example of a self-government agreementis the SecheltIndian Band Self-
Government Act, S.C . 1956, c. 27 . The Sechelt model was path-breaking, but it was
developedinthe pre-Charlottetown era so that its suitability in thepost-Charlottetown era
is questionable and we note that many Aboriginal peoples have expressly stated that they
do not wantthe Sechelt model.
2^TheUmbrella FinalAgreementbetween the Government ofCanada,theCouncil for
Yukon Indians and the Government of the Yukon was signed in Whitehorse on May 29,
1993 . It is published, under the authority of the Minister ofIndian Affairs and Northern
Development, by Supply and Services Canada, 1993 .
25 Yukon FirstNations Self-GovernmentAct, S.C . 1994, c. 35 ; First Nations (Yukon)
Self-Government Act, S.Y. 1993, c. 5; Settlement legislation (to give effect to the land
claims) was enacted at the same time : Yukon First Nations Land Claims Settlement Act,
S.C . 1994, c. 34; Yukon Land Claim FinalAgreements Act, S.Y. 1993, c. 19 .
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are explained laterin this article .) The second list (inpara.13.2) is a list oflaw-
makingpowers thatextend throughoutthe Yukon, butarelimited toFirstNation
citizens . This is an example of "personal jurisdiction" (also explained below) .
The third list (in para. 13.3) is a list oflaw-making powers that are restricted to
the First Nation's own land ; the powers apply to everyone on the land, notjust
First Nation citizens . This is an example of "territorial jurisdiction" (again
explainedbelow). The fourth list ofpowers (in para.13.4) is a listof"emergency
powers" that confer on the First Nation certain special powers to cope with
emergencies on First Nation land .
We recognize that the details of self-government will differ radically from
one partofCanadato another . Solutions that work wellinthe sparselypopulated
Yukonmay notworkin the south. However, the Yukon Agreements do provide
examples of the kinds of jurisdiction which an Aboriginal government may
wish to exercise . It should be emphasized, however, that it is not coincidental
that the Yukon self-government agreements were concluded shortly after an
agreement on a comprehensive landclaims settlement . For Aboriginalpeoples,
the issue ofland is central to self-governmentjurisdiction. We will not focus on
those connections, although it is important to emphasize that as part of the
implementation ofself-government, lands and resources issues will be pivotal
to effective government. The existing land and resource base for most First
Nations is inadequate for effective self-government and this item will require
immediate attention in the transition from the Indian Act to self-government.
A. Territorial Jurisdiction
One issue to be addressed in any self-government agreement is the extent
ofthe First Nation'spower to make laws . One model is a listofpowers confined
to the territory of the First Nation . It is obvious that every First Nation would
require extensive powers over its own land. The management of the land, the
regulation of activity on the land, including hunting, fishing, gathering, mining
and forestry, the licensing ofbusinesses, planning, zoning and building codes,
environmental protection and the administration of justice are among the
subjects that a First Nation would probably wish to regulate . These powers
would be confined to the First Nation's land." The powers would not extend to
Aboriginal people off First Nation land. However, the powers would apply to
both non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal people on First Nation land .
In the Yukon First NationSelf-Government Agreements, 27 where there are
four lists of powers, one list (in clause 13.3) is confined to the First Nation's
Settlement Land . These powers are examples of territorial jurisdiction .
"The fact that both land claims and self-government agreements were concluded in
the Yukon suggests that the resolution of land issues is closely connected to progress on
self-government jurisdiction. This is important to remember when applying the Yukon
model to other contexts .
27 Thejurisdictional provisions are reproduced in an appendix to this article .
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Personal Jurisdiction
There are otherpowers aFirstNationmight wish to exercise that should not
be confined to ]First Nation land. The First Nationmay wish to provide a range
of social services to its citizens, including those whoare living off FirstNation
land. Adoption, guardianship, custody and care ofchildren cannot be confined
toFirstNationland . These issues are central to theachievement oftheobjectives
describedin the contextual statement andarrangements forpersonaljurisdiction
will be part of self-government implementation . Thus, a First Nation will
probably require a second list of powers that are applicable to First Nation
citizens on or off First Nation land. Laws enacted by a First Nation under this
list would constitute a "personal law" that followed First Nation citizens
wherever they were . These laws wouldnot apply to non-Aboriginal people . In
the Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements, two of the four lists of
powers (in clauses 13.1 and 13.2) are not confined to the First Nation's
Settlement Land . They wouldapply to citizens ofthe First Nation throughout
the Yukon and are examples of personal jurisdiction.
Thepersonal jurisdiction of an Aboriginal government, like its territorial
jurisdiction, has the capacity to be compulsory. For example, an Aboriginal
child whohas been placed with a family living outside the Aboriginal territory
wouldnot become subject to provincial or territorial law respecting his or her
custody. This would protect the child from the risk of decisions made by non-
Aboriginal bodies altering the arrangements put in place by Aboriginal law. ®f
course, it wouldbe open to an Aboriginal government not to exercise the full
extent ofits personaljurisdiction, and this wouldbe determined by the political
process internal to the Aboriginal people. It should be noted that the Canadian
Charter ofRights and Freedoms would probably apply to the exercise by an
Aboriginal government of its personal (as well as its territorial) jurisdiction.
Other First Nations will require legislative powers that extend to their
citizens regardless ofresidence. Inthe Yukonexample, evenpersonaljurisdiction
was confined to the boundaries of the Yukon, and for other First Nations this
personaljurisdiction may also be confined to a province or territory, or it may
apply throughout Canada.
Aboriginal self-government could exist in urban areas of Canada in the
form of institutions which deliver services to First Nations, Inuit or Métis
citizens off Aboriginal territories. Personal jurisdiction would be essential to
these developments . A high level of coordination would be required among
various Aboriginal governments to serve their citizenry in an urban setting in
order to avoid duplication of services and enormous cost .
Personaljurisdiction will mean that Aboriginal citizens will "take the law
with them" when they leave Aboriginal territories. This is not anew concept as
it is already a part of Canadian law in family law. We have a developed body
ofprinciples on conflicts oflaw to govern these situations. As well, agreements
that- now exist between provinces and foreign jurisdictions respecting the
enforcement of maintenance and custody orders provide examples of the
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coordination ofdifferent legal regimes in the interests of effective governance .
Similar devices will be available to Aboriginal governments. Moreover, in the
Aboriginal context, we are already familiar with the notion of portability of
rights, such as treaty rights to education, off a territorial base . Personal
jurisdiction builds upon these pre-existing concepts to ensure that Aboriginal
governments willhave effective governingpowersto enablethem toaccomplish
governmental policy objectives like cultural protection in the context of child
welfare.
C. Emergency Jurisdiction
THECANADIAN BARREVIEW
It may be desirable to provide for emergency jurisdiction over persons or
territory in a self-government agreement. The Yukon First Nation Self-
Government Agreements (by clause 13.4) attempt to anticipate some of the
problems that could arise in an emergency as a result of the territorial and
personal restrictions on First Nations' powers . For example, a child mightbe in
danger on Settlement Land, and the First Nation's child welfare officials might
not know whether the child was a First Nation citizen . Or a child might be in
danger offSettlement Land, and itmight not beclearwhich orderofgovernment
hadjurisdiction. To enable prompt action tobe takenin these kinds ofsituations,
the YukonAgreements empower the First Nation to act torelieve anemergency
on Settlement Land, even if the laws of general application are applicable . A
similar power enables the Yukon Territorial Government to act to relieve an
emergency offSettlement Land even ifthe situation is governed by First Nation
law. In each case, as soon as practicable, the matter would be returned to the
correct governmental authority .
III . Exclusive andConcurrent Powers
Another issue to be addressed in the jurisdictional provisions of a self-
government agreement is which Aboriginal legislative powers are to be
"exclusive" and which are to be "concurrent". Exclusive powers are those
possessed only by the Aboriginal people ; neither the federal Parliament nor the
provincial (or territorial) Legislature would be able to exercise thesame power.
Concurrent powers are those possessed not only by the Aboriginal people, but
also by eitherthe federalParliament orthe provincial (orterritorial) Legislature .
The disadvantage of exclusive powers is that they require the enactment of
comprehensive laws by the Aboriginal people; no other laws will be available
to fill gaps . The disadvantage of concurrent powers is that they give rise to the
possibility of inconsistent laws, one enacted by the Aboriginal people and the
otherenactedby thefederalParliamentorthe provincial (or territorial)Legislature .
Rules have to be developed to deal with inconsistency, and these are the topic
of the next section of this paper.
In the Constitution Act, 1867, the law-making powers of the federal
Parliament, and the provincial legislatures are set out in two lists, each ofwhich
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is said to be exclusive. Inpractice, however, considerable evolution and power
sharing has been permitted throughjudicial interpretation . Thetendency ofthe
courts is to recognize overlap between the two lists, in other words, concurrent
powers . For example, protection ofthe environment is not mentioned in either
list. Nevertheless the courts have held that both orders of government possess
extensive, overlapping powers to protect the environment. The point is that
many of the law-making powers possessed by the federal Parliament and the
provincial Legislatures are concurrent .
The Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements (by clause 13 .1)
includeashort listofexclusivepowers . Generally speaking, thelist encompasses
therulesofindoormanagementoftheFirstNation's affairs, andthe administration
ofrights andbenefits under its land claims agreement. The otherlists, described
earlier, contain concurrent powers .
Ill . Intergovernmental Cooperation in Canada
Since 1867,thefederalandprovincialgovernments haveexercisedgovernmental
powers overthe same territoryandoverthe same people, (although the exercise
of jurisdiction by the federal and provincial governments "over" Aboriginal
peoples has been controversial) . Despite minor disputes and lawsuits, the two
orders of government have learned to live together . An extensive network of
relationships has developed at the ministerial and official levels to share
information and ideas and to coordinate policies . In many fields ofconcurrent
jurisdiction, formal agreements have. enabled both orders of government to
work together in pursuit of common goals.
For example, provincial health care plans and provincial social assistance
plans arefundedinpartbythefederal governmentunder shared-cost agreements
which define the basic principles underlying both kinds of plans. Another
example is the policing agreements, under which the IZ.C.M.P . provides
policing services to eight provinces and many municipalities in return for
provincial and municipal sharing of the cost of the services . Another example
is the tax collection agreements, under which the federal government collects
provincial income taxes for nine provinces in return forprovincial agreements
to use the same tax base as the federal income tax.
Aboriginal governmentsentering this complexnetworkoffederal-provincial
relationships willfind advantages in many ofthe techniques of cooperation that
have been developed by the federal and provincial governments. Thus, an
Aboriginal government mayenter into tax-collection agreements with another
government . An Aboriginal government may choose to "rent" the policing or
prosecutorial services of another government. There may be responsibilities
which a First Nation prefers to assume gradually, allowing services to be
rendered to First Nations citizens by another government until the First Nation
has developed the capacity or policy to deliver the services.
The lesson to be drawn from intergovernmental cooperation is that self-
government does not occur in a political vacuum. An Aboriginal government
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will not have toimmediately assume all the functions of a modern government.
Agreements ofvarious kinds are required to make an order of government fully
operational.Moreover, intergovernmental cooperationand sharingofjurisdiction
and resources is the norm rather than the exception in Canadian federalism .
A. Federal-Provincial Rulesfor Inconsistent Laws
A self-government agreement must deal with the relationship between
federal and provincial (or territorial) laws, and Aboriginal laws . In the federal-
provincial context, conflicts between federal and provincial laws are resolved
by the rule offederal paramountcy . Thisruleis not as importantasitmight seem,
because the courts accept a very narrow definition ofinconsistency: only if one
law expressly contradicts the otheris there an inconsistency that triggers the rule
of federal paramountcy . If the two laws can exist side by side without
contradiction, there is no inconsistency and both laws remain operative .
Forexample, inConstructionMontcalm Inc. v. MinimumWage Commission
(Quêbec) '28 the Supreme Court of Canada held that a federal law stipulating a
minimum wage for federal contractors was not inconsistent with a provincial
law that stipulated a higher minimum wage. The Supreme Court of Canada
reasoned thatthefederal law did notprohibit ahigher wage ; therefore, both laws
could co-exist . The practicalresult was thatthe federal contractor had to pay the
higher Québec minimum wage, and could not rely on the lower federal figure .
Thus, courts will go to great lengths to uphold legislation and will be extremely
reluctant to find inconsistency if the laws can be reconciled .
There is nothing to suggest that this same approach would not be brought
to an analysis of inconsistency in the context of Aboriginal laws .
B. Displacement ofFederal andProvincial Laws
Each self-government agreement must provide for the transition to self-
government, so as to guard against a vacuum of laws during the initial period
before the Aboriginal government has had time to make the laws that are within
its responsibilities . This problem arose in 1867 when the Parliament of Canada
and the Legislatures of Ontario and Québec were first established . The solution
in 1867 was embodied in section 129 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which
provided that all laws in force in 1867 should continue in force until they were
repealed, abolishedor alteredby the Parliament ofCanada or the Legislature of
aprovince. This provided forthe continuedexistence ofpre-confederation laws .
Although the main purpose of section 129 was transitional, some pre-
confederation laws have never been replaced and continue in force today.
The Charlottetown Accord borrowed from section 129 in proposing a
similar rule for the transition to self-government. The Accord provided (by
clause 47) that "federal and provincial laws will continue to applyuntil they are
28 [197911 S.C.R . 754.
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displaced by laws passed by governments of Aboriginal peoples pursuant to
their authority" . This clause wouldhave ensured thatpre-self-governmentlaws
wouldcontinue to apply until displaced .
Such a transitional clause would not only govern the transition to self-
governmentbut also haveapennanenteffect . Theclause would haveestablished
an importantgeneralrule that Aboriginal laws could "displace" laws ofgeneral
application. In other words, where Aboriginal laws were inconsistent with laws
ofgeneral application, the Aboriginal lawwouldbe paramount and the law of
general application would have to yield .
TheCharlottetown Accord proposed (also by clause 47) one exception to
the general rule of Aboriginal paramountcy. Where a federal or provincial law
was "essential to the preservation of peace, order, and good government in
Canada", then that lawwould prevail over an inconsistent Aboriginal law. The
meaning ofthis peace, order and good government exceptionhas been the topic
of some debateP and certainly this provision was the most troubling for
Aboriginal peoples . In our view, however, the exception would be given a
narrow scope by the courts, drawingby analogy on the existingjurisprudence
that has given a narrow interpretation to the words "peace, order and good
government" in section 91 ofthe Constitution Act, 1867. Theexception would
probably cover emergency laws andlaws designedto prevent injury or harm to
non-Aboriginal people or land 30 It is reasonable that laws of this category
(essential for peace, order, and good government) should apply to Aboriginal
peoples, and should not be subject to displacement by Aboriginal laws . For
example, if a province required all residents to be inoculated against an
epidemic of smallpox, Aboriginal peoples should be subject to the same
requirement as non-Aboriginal people . Indeed, no Aboriginal government
wouldwant to create health risks forAboriginal people or their non-Aboriginal
neighbours, so these kinds of limits on Aboriginal government jurisdiction
wouldnot be major issues from apragmatic perspective.
The Charlottetown Accord did not define inconsistency for the purpose of
the paramountcy provisions, but silence indicates that the narrow definition
developedin the federal-provincial contextwould also applyhere . For example,
a First Nation might enact laws to regulate the discharge of waste material by
a business located on First Nation land. The same business may be subject to
controls enacted by the province . In this situation, the courts would probably
hold that there wasno inconsistency between the twolaws : the business would
be obliged to obey both the First Nation and the provincial rules . If the First
Nation's rules were the stricter of the two, then the First Nation would in effect
be the primary legislator.
29 seeA. Bissonnette, "Analysepothume d'un accordmis àmort" (1993)Recherches
Amdrindiennes an Québec 80 at 83-84.
30 For a more complete analysis of the existing peace, order, and good government
provision seeP.W . Hogg, ConstitutionalLawofCanada, 3d ed . (Toronto : Carswell,1992)
ch. 17 .
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C. YukonSelf-Government
The Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements, like the
Charlottetown Accord, provide (by clause 13.5) thatlaws of general application
shall continue to apply to the First Nation, its citizens and First Nation Land . In
the event of inconsistency between a law of the First Nation and a law of the
Yukon, it is the law of the First Nation that is paramount. In the event of
inconsistency between a law of the First Nation and a federal law, the Self-
Government Agreements are incomplete . They provide (by clause 13.5.2) for
afuture agreementbetween the FirstNation andCanada"whichwill identify the
areas in which the laws of [theFirst Nation] shall prevail over federal laws". No
future agreement has been entered into.31
It is an unsatisfactory feature of the Yukon Self-Government Agreements
that they do not settle the precise form of the rules of paramountcy between
federal and FirstNations laws . Ideally, alljurisdictional issues shouldbe settled
in the self-government agreement and not postponed to some future process.
However, the provision that was included does contemplate that there will be
areas in which the laws ofthe First Nation will be paramount over federal laws .
With respect to inconsistency betweena First Nation law and aYukon law
(where the rule is First Nationparamountcy), the YukonAgreements substitute
a broader definition of inconsistency for the narrow common-law definition.
According to clause 13.5 .3 of the Yukon Agreements, a Yukon law shall be
inoperative "to the extent that it provides for any matter for which provision is
made in a law enacted by [the First Nation]" . This means that whenever a First
Nation law covers a particular field that is also occupied by Yukon law, the
Yukon law is displaced . It is not necessary to show that the two laws are
inconsistent in the narrow sense of contradictory; the mere fact that they make
provision for the samematter would cause the Yukonlaw to yield. The general
idea here is that once a First Nation elects to provide a particular service
(formerly provided by the Yukon) or regulate a particular activity (formerly
regulated by the Yukon), then the First Nation wouldbecome the sole provider
orregulator, requiring the Yukon Territorial Governmentto withdraw from the
field.
31 The SecheltIndian BandSelf-Government Act, supra footnote 23 provides, by ss .
37 and 38, that federal and provincial laws of general application apply to the Band, its
members and Sechelt lands . In the case ofprovincial laws, however, the laws oftheBand
takepriority . Thus, intheevent ofinconsistency betweenaprovincial law and aBand law,
it is the Band law that is paramount . However, in the event of inconsistency between a
federal law and aBandlaw, it is thefederallaw that is paramount . The SecheltActis silent
on the definition of inconsistency so that the narrow express contradiction test would
probably apply.
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V. Administration ofJustice
An Aboriginal government will require the power to enforce its ownlaws, and
may wish to enforce those federal and provincial (or territorial) laws that
continue to apply on Aboriginal land . TheAboriginalpeople will wantpolicing,
prosecutions, courts and corrections to operate so as to ensure a peaceful and
law-abiding Aboriginal community. Thepeople will also wantall aspects ofthe
justice system to be administered with sensitivity to Aboriginal ways and
Aboriginal problems. Indeedprovendiscrimination against Aboriginalpeoples
in the Canadian criminal justice system requires the development of new
approaches to the field and greater autonomy for Aboriginal peoples to design
andimplement criminal justice measures in their communities."
Thefederal andprovincial(orterritorial) governmentswillalsobeconcerned
with the enforcement of their laws of general application on Aboriginal land.
Given the interests of the other two orders of government, and the limited
resources ofpersonnelandfunds thatare availableto an Aboriginalgovernment,
it maybe desirable for anAboriginal government to exercise its power overthe
administration ofjustice in accordance with ajustice agreement entered into
with the othertwoorders ofgovernment.Inthatway, theAboriginal government
would gain access to services and funding that can be supplied by the other
orders of government, and all three orders of government would participate in
the construction of a regime that is compatible with theirlegitimate objectives .
TheYukonFirstNationSelf-GovernmentAgreementsprovideone possible
modelforthe administrationofjusticeprovisions . Underthose Agreements, the
First Nation has, in its catalogue of legislative powers on First Nation land
(clause 13.3.17), the power over "administration of justice".33 However, the
First Nation agrees (clause 13.6.3) not to exercise the power unilaterally for a
period often years. For thattime, thepower can onlybe exercisedin accordance
with a justice agreement entered into with federal and territorial governments.
The Self-Government Agreements (clause 13 .6 .1) oblige the First Nation and
both governments to negotiate ajustice agreement, and once an agreement is
negotiatedthe FirstNation would exercise its powerover the administration of
justice to give effect to the agreement. Until ajustice agreement is reached, or
if no agreement is reached, there are (in clause 13.6.4) interim provisions for
enforcement of First Nation laws, jurisdiction of courts and corrections. The
interim provisions are designed to be replaced by ajustice agreement, butifno
agreement is reached, the interim provisions expire at the end of the ten-year
period (clause 13.6 .6) . At that time, the First Nation assumes full possession of
its power over the administration of justice. If at that time there is a justice
32 See the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Roundtable on
Justice (Ottawa: The Commission, 1993).
33 TheYukon Agreements do not recognize First Nations' jurisdiction over "criminal
law", which is now reserved exclusively to the federal government . Some First Nations
may want at least concurrent jurisdiction over criminal-law-making, as well as the
administration ofjustice, which now rests with provincial governments .
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agreement in force, then of course the First Nation would be bound to act in
accordance with the agreement.
Vl . Justiciability ofSelf-Government
Disputes will inevitably arise out of the interpretation, administration or
implementation of self-government agreements . Disputes will arise regarding
the scope of Aboriginal government jurisdictions and fiscal matters. Many of
these will raise legal issues, and accordingly will come within the jurisdiction
of the provincial (or territorial) or federal courts . Unless special courts are
established to addresslegalissues relating to self-government agreements, legal
conflicts will come before Canadian courts . Theburden on Canadian courts is
bound to be significant and active programs for judicial education in the field
of Aboriginal and treaty rights and the recruitment of Aboriginal people for
judicial appointments are two steps which should be taken to meet the legal
challenges in the transition to self-government.
In the broader context ofdispute resolution, we contemplate that the kinds
ofdisputes whichwill ariseduring this transition period willbe bothinternaland
external to the Aboriginal community. Internal disputes are those either among
citizens of the Aboriginal communities or between citizens and Aboriginal
governments. Internal disputes maybe criminal or civil (including of a family
nature) and will require community dispute resolution processes as part of the
self-government arrangement. Externaldisputes arethosewhich involvecitizens
of the Aboriginal community and non-Aboriginal governments or Aboriginal
governments and non-Aboriginal governments. While Aboriginalpeoplesmay
wish to establish justice systems to govern internal relations between their
citizens residing on theirterritories, andin some cases non-residents andvisitors
(andthe Yukon exampleis a modelhere), there is an immediate need to consider
how disputes of an external nature will be resolved .
To date, all disputes between Aboriginal peoples andgovernments have
been brought before the Canadian courts . As the issues become more complex
during the implementation of self-government, the Canadian courts will not be
the most efficient and cost-effective forum for dispute resolution.34 They have
also been questioned as appropriate forums for resolving the disputes between
Aboriginal peoples and government as these disputes are intercultural and the
courts do not reflect Aboriginal culture or even an equal power relationship
94 Indeed ongoing litigation such as Delgamuukw v. Attorney General ofBritish
Columbia(1993),104 D.L.R. (4th)470 (B .C.C.A .), whichinvolvedover350 trialdays and
several monthsofappeal hearingswiththousands ofexhibits, makesit clearthat theburden
placed on the courtto deal with these claims within conventional lawis unworkable . The
CourtofAppeal inDelgamuukw expressed averystrong preference forpoliticalresolution
ofAboriginal disputes . TheSupreme Court ofCanada, which has granted leave to appeal,
has granted theparties an 18-month delayin order to encourage them to reach anegotiated
agreement.
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betweenAboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canadian society." We feel
that it is preferable to establish processes to facilitate the out=ofcourtresolution
of disputes in anon-adversarial atmosphere, using mediators, arbitrators and
advisers who are familiar with the self-government agreementandAboriginal
practices. Disputes arising from the negotiations and the implementation of
agreements are appropriate for nonjudicial forums . Moreover, a tribunal
composed of individuals expert in the subject area could be cost-efficient,
expeditious and respectful of the different cultural and legal traditions of the
parties. Such a tribunal could be established either in a self-government
agreement or in a framework agreement which called for self-government
negotiations .
TheYukonFirstNationshavesetup alternative disputeresolution procedures
of mediation and negotiation in their land claims agreements . TheYukon First
Nation Self-Government Agreements, by clause 24.0, make those procedures
available for disputes arising under the Self-Government Agreements and
provide an attractive model.
While ADR mechanisms36 can be established to assist self-government
negotiations and the implementation of self-government agreements, legal
questions will arise that will have to be resolved by the courts . It is likely that
aCanadian court, whenfacedwith suchdisputes, wouldapproach this task with
thepurposive approach seenin Chartercases. This approach entails examining
the purpose of the transition to self-government and the need to respect
constitutionally-protected Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 . Thefactthat Aboriginal peoples are vulnerable in their
relations with the Crown, given that the Crown is more powerful, would also
influence the court in scrutinizing the conduct of government to ensure that its
duties as a fiduciary were fulfilled.
A. Taxation
. Financing of,Self-Government
For Aboriginal governments and Aboriginal jurisdictions to be meaningful,
they must have an adequate financial basis. This means that Aboriginal
governments should have the capacity to levy taxes, to borrow and to have
access to transfers from the other orders of government .
The Constitution Act, 1867, which says nothing about Aboriginal
governments, confers taxation powers on the federal Parliament and the
provincial legislatures . It distinguishes between "direct" and"indirect" taxes.
" See M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms : Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences" (1989-90) 6 Can. H.R.Y.B . 3.
"Anappropriate disputeresolution process would need to be aproduct of agreement
and would need to reflect Aboriginal culture and ensure Aboriginal representation.
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Direct taxes are those that are unlikely to be "passed on" by the initial payer of
the tax. Direct taxes have been held to include income taxes, property taxes and
sales taxes (provided the tax is imposed on the consumer, not the vendor) .
Indirect taxes are those that tend to be passed on by the initial payer of the tax,
so that it is hard to know where they ultimately fall. Customs and excise taxes
fallinto the indirect category, because the importer or manufacturer is expected
to include the taxes in the price that he or she charges for the imported or
manufactured product, and the ultimate burden of the tax is passed on to the
consumer.
Under the Constitution Act, 1867, the provinces are generally limited to
direct taxes, the reasoning being that they should not be allowed to export the
burden oftheir taxes to the residents of other provinces; the federal Parliament,
onthe other hand, is authorized to levyboth direct and indirect taxes." Because
both orders of government have the power to levy direct taxes, the taxpayer is
often in the position of having to pay taxes to twogovernments. In the case of
the personal incometax,the federal government hasentered into "tax collection
agreements" withnine oftheten provinces, underwhich the federalgovernment
agrees to collect the province's share ofthe tax, and the provinces agree to use
the same tax base as that of the federal tax. This relieves the taxpayer from the
need to file two returns with different information and calculations .
There is also a level of taxation at the municipal level, which is exercised
bymunicipalities underpowersdelegatedto them by the provinces orterritories .
The most common municipal tax is a tax on real property in the municipality .
Theobvious approach toAboriginal taxationpowers wouldbeforAboriginal
peoples to possess the same power to levy "direct" taxes as the provinces . This
is not nowthe case with Indian Act bands, which under section 83(1)(a) of the
Indian Acthave the power to levy municipal-like property taxes, subject to the
approval of the Minister of Indian Affairs . The Sechelt Indian Band Self-
Government Act confers apower of taxation that is similar to the Indian Act
power, although there is no requirement of ministerial approval.
The Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements, by clause 14.0,
confer on the First Nations not only the power to levy property taxes, but also
the power tolevy otherkinds ofdirecttaxes ontheircitizens on Settlement Land.
However, the Agreements contemplate thatthe First Nations willenter into tax-
sharing arrangements with the Yukon Territorial Government so that there is a
sharing of tax "room" and general coordination between the tax systems ofthe
two governments. Only pursuant to these intergovernmental arrangements
wouldthe First Nations acquirethepowerto levy taxes other thanproperty taxes
on non-Aboriginal people and corporations on Settlement Land . Yukon tax-
sharing agreements have not yet been entered into, but they could, for example,
providefor asingle tax-collection agency forboth Yukon andFirst Nation taxes,
and agreements as to therates oftaxthat each government would impose, sothat
37 Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K .) 30 &31 Vict., c. 3, ss . 91(3), 92(2).
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the tax-filing obligations and the total burden of taxation were reasonable and
predictable."
Transfer Payments
Evenwith fullpowers ofdirect taxation,mostAboriginal communities lack
the taxbase thatwould enablethem to raise enoughrevenue to provide services
at a level that is appropriate for Canadian citizens . This is also true ofthe "have
not" provinces and both the territories, all of which are net beneficiaries of
federal transfer payments . Section 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides
as follows :
Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle ofmaking
equalization payments to ensurethatprovincialgovernmentshave sufficientrevenues
to provide reasonably comparable levels ofpublic services atreasonably comparable
levels of taxation .
This provision sets a standard forfederal transferpayments to the provinces, but
it says nothing about the territories or about Aboriginal governments .
In the discussions leading to the Charlottetown Accord, the Aboriginal
organizations were unsuccessful in their efforts to secure an amendment to
section 36(2) to extend it to Aboriginal governments . Instead, the Accord (by
clause 50) provided that the financing ofself-government was to be dealt with
in a later "political accord" . That political accord would "commit federal and
provincial governments to the principle of providing the governments of
Aboriginal peoples with fiscal or other resources, such as land, to assist those
governments to govern their own affairs" . The Charlottetown Accord (still in
clause 50) explicitly required that Aboriginal governments had tobe capable of
"providing essential public services at levels reasonably comparable to those
available to other Canadians in the vicinity" . The Charlottetown Accord thus
39 Under the IndianAct, 1t.S.C . 1985, c.1-6, s . 87 there is an exemption from federal
and provincial taxes for"the personal property of an Indian orband situatedon areserve" .
Section 87 has been held to provide an exemption from sales taxes and income taxes for
status Indians . The exemption is confined to reserves, and this has led to legal decisions
attemptingto definethenatureoftheconnectionwithareserve that is neededto qualify for
the exemption . Section 87 applies only to federal and provincial (or territorial) taxes, and
would not preclude a First Nation from levying taxes on status Indians on reserves .
The four Yukon First Nations who have concluded land claims agreements have
decided to give up the section 87 exemption (Council for Yukon Indians, UmbrellaFinal
Agreement, 1993, cl . 20.6),inreturn for acapital sum thatconstitutes compensation for the
loss ofthe exemption. Thebuy-outofthe exemption is delayed forthree years to give the
First Nation time to get ready for the introduction of taxes .
Section 87 provides a tax exemption for an Indian Act band, as well as for
individuals . It goes without saying that, under self-government, the First Nation itself and
its corporations should continue to be exempt from federal and provincial taxes . This is
providedforinthe SecheltIndianBand Self-GovernmentAct, s . 35, and inthe Yukon First
Nation Self-Government Agreements, cl . 15.0 .
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essentially accepted the principle that transfer payments to Aboriginal
governments shouldbe sufficient to enablethose governments toprovide public
services ofsimilarquality to thoseprovidedby otherlevels ofgovernment . This
standard should be reflected in financing agreements with Aboriginal peoples.
C. Yukon Example
The Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements, whose terms were
settledbefore the Charlottetown Accord, by clause 16.0, oblige Canadato enter
into a "self-government financial transfer agreement" with each First Nation
"with theobjective ofproviding [the FirstNation] with resources to enable [the
FirstNation] toprovide public services atlevels reasonably comparable to those
generallyprevailing inthe Yukon, atreasonably comparable levels oftaxation".
The language used borrows from section 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
and the reference to Yukon (along with other provisions, notably clause 16.4.4)
points the negotiators to the formula used for financing the Yukon Territorial
Government. Some of the financing of First Nation Governments would
inevitably come out ofexisting transfers to the Yukon Territorial Government
in recognition thatservices had been shifted from the Yukon to the First Nation.
But the Self-Government Agreements, by clause 18.1, provide that a decrease
in federal funding to the Yukonmustnot be so severe as to cause anyreduction
in the level or quality of Yukon services to non-Aboriginal Yukon residents.
The Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreementsmake provision (by
clause 24) for a failure to agree upon the terms ofthe self-government financial
transferagreement. In thatevent, eitherpartymay referthematter to amediation
process that is provided forin theland claims agreement; ifmediation fails, then
the matter can be referred by the parties to an arbitration process that is also
provided for in the land claims agreement .
Whilejurisdictional issuesmustbe settled in aself-government agreement,
it is only the adequate financing of self-government that guarantees that an
Aboriginal government will become operational . The Yukon model suggests
one route and certainly a combination oftaxing powers and transfer payments
is required to fully implement the inherent right of self-government.
VIII . Status ofSelf-Government Agreements
A. Protectionfrom Unilateral Alteration
TheCharlottetown Accord contemplated (in clause 46) that self-government
agreements would create treaty rights that would be constitutionally protected
by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . Through section 35(1), as well
as the express recognition of the inherent right, Aboriginal self-government
would have been a constitutionally-protected "order ofgovernment" within the
Canadian federation. The failure of the Charlottetown Accord means that these
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provisions are not in the Constitution. Under the present Constitution, without
the Charlottetown amendments, what is the status of self-government
agreements?,
Aself-government agreement that was part of a "land claims agreement"
would be protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . A self-
government agreement that was not part of a land claims agreement would, at
least if it contained no language to the contrary, be a modern "treaty" which
would alsobe protectedundersection35 ofthe ConstitutionAct,1982 . It is clear
that "an exchange of solemn promises" is a treaty, even ifno cession of landis
involved." It is also clear from subsection (3) of section 35 that the section
applies to post-1982 treaties ; the reference in subsection (3) to "land claims
agreements" wouldnot exclude other kinds of modern treaties . It follows that
a self-government agreementwould create treaty rights thatwouldbe protected
by section 35 . This wouldmeanthat an attempt by the Parliament of Canada or
a provincial (or territorial) Legislature to alter the terms of a self-government
agreement, without the consent of the affected First Nation, would be struck
down by the courts .
The present policy of the Government of Canada is to deny treaty status to
self-government agreements . This policy is inconsistent with an effective
transition to self-government andshould be rethought . TheYukon First Nation
Final Agreements provide that the Self-Government Agreements are not to be
regarded as creating treaty rights that are protected by section 35 . The federal
government's policy pre-dates the Charlottetown Accord, and reflects a hope
that the constitutional status ofAboriginal self-governmentcould be dealt with
in a comprehensive constitutional amendment. The failure of the Accord
removes thereasonfor the Government's policy and should lead to its reversal.
The policy of denying treaty status to self-government agreements has been
implemented by a clause in self-government agreements (or, as in the Yukon
case,in alandclaims agreement thatincludes orcontemplates aself-government
agreement) underwhichGovernment and the FirstNationconcerned agreethat
the self-government agreement is not to create treaty rights within the meaning
of section 35 . This kind of clause is considered effective in denying such
agreements treaty status under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 .
Aself-government agreement that has, by express agreement, been denied
the status of a treaty may nevertheless be constitutionally protected. This is
because section 35 protects "aboriginal" as well as "treaty" rights, and the
inherent right of self-government is an Aboriginal right. The self-government
agreements can be regarded as giving form and structure to the Aboriginal right
of self-government . The agreements do not create the right, which is inherent.
The agreements are necessary, because in the twentieth century Aboriginal
governments have to co-exist with federal and provincial (or territorial)
governments; the agreements settle mutually acceptable rules to govern the
relationshipbetween thethree orders ofgovernment . It is still thecase that when
19 Simon v . The Queen, [1985] 2 S .C.R . 387 .
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a First Nation passes laws and exercises other powers of self-government it is
exercising an inherent power of self-government thatis protected by section 35
of the Constitution Act, 1982 . If this is so, then any attempt by the Parliament
ofCanada oraprovincial (or territorial) Legislatureto changetheterms ofaself-
government agreement without the consent ofthe affected First Nation would
be struck down by the courts .
Our conclusion is that a self-government agreement that has, by express
agreement, been denied the status of a treaty may still be constitutionally
protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 as an expression of
Aboriginal rights . This is another reason why the federal government should
reconsider its policy of denying treaty status to self-government agreements .
There is no point in denying treaty status to the agreements if the right of self-
government is constitutionally protected anyway . Of course, the federal
preference for a general constitutional amendmentrespecting self-government,
which seemed to have beenachieved at Charlottetown, is probably now beyond
reach . Accordingly, the best course is to accord treaty status to self-government
agreements. That provides the aboriginal order of government with secure
constitutional protection under section 35 . This would mean that changes in a
self-government agreement could not be made by the unilateral action of the
federal Parliament' but wouldhave to be madeby the amending procedures set
out inthe agreement, which would obviously involve the consent ofthe FirstNation.
B . Application to Third Parties
Where Aboriginal self-government enjoys the constitutional protection of
section 35, either because it is based on a treaty, or because it is an exercise of
an aboriginal right, it is still desirable that legislation be enacted, certainly by
theParliament ofCanada, andperhapsbytheprovincial(orterritorial) Legislature
as well, to implement the underlying self-government agreement . This is also
true ofland claims agreements.41 The pointoflegislation is to make certain that
the self-government agreement(andtherefore allthe powers ofAboriginal self-
government) is binding on third parties . In the absence of legislation, a non-
Aboriginal person or corporation to whom an Aboriginal law applied might be
successful in arguing that he or she or it was not bound by the Aboriginal law,
because he or she or it was not a party to the agreement that defined the scope
of the Aboriginal government's power to make the law . The enactment of a
statute precludes this line of argument, because a statute is obviously binding
on non-Aboriginal and (subject to section 35) Aboriginal people alike.1
4° Without constitutionalprotectionanintergovernmental agreementcan beunilaterally
altered by the federal Parliament: Re CanadaAssistance Plan, [1991] 2 S.C.R . 525 .
4'A.R . Thompson, "Land Claim Settlements in Northern Canada" (1991) 55 Sask. L.
Rev . 127.
42 The Yukon First Nation Self-GovernmentAgreements (as well as the Yukon land
claims agreements) havebeen implemented byfederal andterritorial legislation: see supra
footnote 25 .
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IX . Limitations on Aboriginal Governments
Like other modern governments, Aboriginal governments are subject to a
variety of limitations. The limits are external and internal . In the external
category is the Charter and international human rights standards. Internal
limitations are those imposed by Aboriginal peoples' own constitutions and
laws, providing for checks andbalances on Aboriginal governments including
financial control and accountability procedures and standards for conflicts of
interests and ethics of public officials . While these internal procedures may be
"foreign" to Aboriginal cultures, thevalues ofpublic duty andresponsibility are
integral to good government, especially in a periodoftransition away from the
Indian Act. In a contemporary government context, measures to deal with
financial accountability and conflicts ofinterest are cornerstones ofresponsible
and accountable government .'
A. Canadian Charter ofRights andFreedoms
Aboriginal leaders, and particularly the First Nations, leadership, have
expressed reservations about the application of the Charter to Aboriginal
governments. The reasons are twofold . First, the Charter was developed
without the involvement or consent of Aboriginal peoples anddoes not accord
with Aboriginal culture, values and traditions . Second, the Charter calls for an
adversarial approach to theresolution ofrights conflicts before Canadian courts
and there is a concern thatthis confrontational mode will undermine Aboriginal
approaches to conflict resolution. On the other side of the issue, Aboriginal
women's organizations, such as the Native Women's Association of Canada,
haveinsisted thatthe Charterapplyto all Aboriginal governments to ensure that
humanrights standards are respected .
Although there is no consensus on the issue, many Aboriginal people see
the application of the Charter as simply inappropriate, because it does not
reflect Aboriginal values or approaches to resolving disputes . This is not to say
that Aboriginal peoples have no concern for individual rights and individual
security under Aboriginal governments. The concern rests more with the
Charter's elevation ofthe guaranteed legal rights over unguaranteed social and
economic rights, the emphasis on rights rather than responsibilities, the failure
to emphasize collective rights, and the litigation modelofenforcement. These
are among the features of the Charter that are alien to many Aboriginal
communities. The solution might be the development ofan Aboriginal Charter
(or Charters) of Rights which could exist alongside the Canadian Charter.
a3 Itis worthnoting that in the United States many tribes have laws and procedures for
addressing alleged conflicts of interests on the part ofpublic office holders. The Navajo
Nation has an Office of Conflicts and Ethics in Government which actually hears
complaints by members ofthetribe and provides direct redress for violation of the Navajo
Code ofEthics.
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B. Section 32
The extent to which Aboriginal self-government is constrained by the
Charter is not clear. Section 32 of the Charter provides that it applies to "the
Parliament andgovernment ofCanada" and "the legislature andgovernment of
each province". TheSupremeCourt ofCanada has held that thisis anexhaustive
statement of the bodies that are bound by the Charter.' Section 32 does not
contemplate the existence of an Aboriginal order of government . Thus the
CharlottetownAccordDraftLegalText(by section27)proposed the amendment
of section 32 in order to make it include an express statement that the Charter
also applied to "all legislative bodies and governments of the Aboriginal
peoples of Canada".
Despite the silence ofsection 32 on Aboriginal governments, it is probable
that a court wouldhold that Aboriginal governments areboundby the Charter.4s
This would be so where self-government institutions have been created by
statute, because the Charter applies to all bodies exercising statutory powers .46
Whereself-government institutions have beencreated by an Aboriginal people
and empowered by a self-government agreement, the source of the self-
governmentpowers is probably a treaty right(ifthe self-government agreement
has treaty status) or an aboriginal right (the inherent right of self-government)
or both. Even here, the self-government agreement requires the aid ofa statute
to make clear that the agreement is binding on third parties. The statute
implementing the self-government agreementprobably constitutes a sufficient
involvement by the Parliament of Canada to make the Charter applicable .
C. Section 25
Assuming that the Charter is applicable to Aboriginal governments, we
must consider the effect of section 25 of the Charter. Section 25 provides that
the Charter is not to be construed "so as to abrogate or derogate from any
aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal
peoples of Canada". The main purpose of section 25 is to make clear that the
prohibition of racial discrimination in section 15 of the Charter is not to be
interpreted as abrogating aboriginal or treaty rights that are possessed by a class
ofpeople defined by culture orrace. It is, therefore, designed as ashield toguard
against diminishing aboriginal and treaty rights in situations where non-
Aboriginal peoples might challenge the special status and rights of Aboriginal
peoples as contrary to equality guarantees . However, because Aboriginal
governments werenot contemplated by the drafters ofthe Charter, it is unclear
°° R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986) 2 S.C.R. 573.
4s Contra: K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Government and the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms : A Legal Perspective", paper prepared for the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, 1994 [unpublished] on file with the authors .
46 Hogg, supra footnote 30, s. 34.2(b).
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how section 25 might be interpreted to exempt the exercise ofAboriginal self-
government from the Charter.
We believe that it is unlikely that a court would regard section 25 as
providing a blanket immunity from the Charter to Aboriginal governments,
even though the governments were exercising powers of self-government
derived from atreaty or from an aboriginal right (the inherent right) . However,
it is likely that some actions ofAboriginalgovernments wouldbe exemptfrom
the Charter byvirtue of section 25 and that the Charter wouldbe interpreted in
a mannerdeferential to Aboriginal culture. Immunity from Charter application
mightoccurwherean Aboriginal governmenthas takenmeasuresto implement
or self-regulate aboriginal or treaty rights of harvesting, hunting, fishing or the
management of Aboriginal lands and resources. In that case, the Aboriginal
government is invoking not only a right of governance, but also another
aboriginal or treaty right.
Interpretationsofthe Charterwhichareconsistent withAboriginal cultures
and traditions would probably be foundwhen the court is faced with asituation
where differentstandards applyand the difference is integral to culturally-based
policy within an Aboriginal community. Forexample, if an aboriginaljuvenile
justice system was created in which legal counsel is not provided to an
"accused" person, wouldthis be considered unconstitutional as denying alegal
right to an accused person? If the juvenile justice system was reflecting
Aboriginal culture and traditions, section 25 would shield such practices from
attack based on the values expressed in the legal rights provisions of the
Charter. In other words, the legal rights provisions would be given a new
interpretation in light of Aboriginal traditions .
The point here is that the application of the Charter, when viewed with
section 25, should not mean that Aboriginal governments must follow the
policies and emulate the style of government of the federal and provincial
governments. Section25 allows an Aboriginalgovernmentto design programs
and laws which are different, for legitimate cultural reasons, and have these
reasons considered as relevant should such differences invite judicial review
under the Charter. Section 25 would allow Aboriginal governments to protect,
preserve andpromote the identity oftheir citizens through unique institutions,
norms and government practices .
D. Aboriginal Charters ofRights
Theuncertaintiesthathave been described in the application ofthe Charter
to Aboriginal governments would be diminished by the development of
Aboriginal Charters ofRights . Because ofthe culturaldifferences ofAboriginal
communities andthe need to break out ofthe tradition of imposed legal norms
and instruments, restrictions on the powers ofAboriginal governments should
be defined by Aboriginal peoples themselves . There has been some discussion
amongAboriginal peoples ofthe development of Aboriginal Charters ofRights
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that would either displace the Canadian Charter or exist alongside theCanadian
Charter in its application to Aboriginal governments .
It is only realistic to recognize that a single Aboriginal Charter would be
very difficult to develop, given the diversity of Aboriginal peoples . A number
ofAboriginal Charters is more likelythan a single one . Nor shouldwe forget the
difficulty (or perhaps impossibility) of securing the amendment of the
Constitution of Canada that would be required to displace the Canadian
Charter. These realities lead us torecommend that each First Nation, M6tis and
Inuit group should develop its own human rights provisions as part of its own
constitution . Such provisions would afford protection for those human rights
that each community regarded as paramount and could also provide for
procedures to reconcile human rights disputes when they arise . In the absence
ofa constitutional amendment, these provisions could not displace the Charter,
but would be recognised by the courts, who wouldthen bemorelikely (invoking
section 25) to respect the laws and decisions that had been made by an
Aboriginal government within the framework of its constitution .
Conclusion
Cooperation, imagination and political will are needed to make progress in the
achievement of Aboriginal self-government. We believe there are very few
constitutional impediments to the achievement of Aboriginal self-government
in Canadian constitutional law . Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982
providesthebase upon whichAboriginalpeoples and governmentcanconstruct
self-government agreements and invest the agreements with constitutional
status .
There are many important inducements to proceeding with the
implementation of Aboriginal self-government in Canada. The litigation o£
matters of self-government is open-ended and the outcomes are unpredictable .
The legal issues are complex and legal proceedings are lengthy and costly . 47
Moreover, the outcome oflitigation is usually more negotiation, as courts have
never imposed an agreement on the parties, and perhaps could not because of
the nature ofthirdparty interests in some ofthelitigation . It is clearly in the best
interests of allparties to come to a negotiation table where an agreement can be
reached based on reasoning broader than that permitted by legal doctrine and
constitutional remedies . Such an agreement provides the certainty that is so
conspicuously lacking in the general law ofaboriginal rights . The achievement
of self-government agreements requires significant change in government
policy and new priorities directed at rebuilding the relationships between the
federal governmentandAboriginalpeoples, alongwith provincial andterritorial
governments .48
47 The Delgamuukw litigation, described in footnote 34, supra, is a case in point .
48 Perhaps with theplatformof the Liberal Party ofCanada, supra footnote 4, we will
see this kind of new direction . The platform recognizes the inherent right of self-
government, although it does not detail an implementation plan or process . The Liberal
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Many specific Aboriginal policies need to be reconsidered by government
in orderto facilitate a successfulnegotiationprocess. Some policies whichwere
part ofgovernment approaches to Aboriginalpeoples priortothe Charlottetown
Accord need to bere-evaluated and possibly abandonedinfavour ofapproaches
more consistent withthe commitment to implementing an inherentright ofself-
government. TheYukonexample is worthevaluating carefullynotonly interms
of its creative approaches to jurisdiction and financing but also in terms of
problems like the absence of treaty protection ofrights in the agreements .
Our conclusions may be summarized as follows:
1 . The defeat ofthe Charlottetown Accord should notbe permittedto halt
the movement toward the implementation of Aboriginal self-government.
Indeed, the consensus at Charlottetown on the nature of the inherent right and
the process to invigorate it should encouragethemovement to self-government.
2. Many of the terms of the Charlottetown Accord, and certainly the
recognition oftheinherent right and thecontextual statement; couldbe included
in a political accord between governments and Aboriginal organizations that
could form the framework for specific self-government negotiations . This
framework couldbe comprehensive for all Aboriginal peoples or couldinvolve
separateframeworksforTreatyFirstNations andnon-treatyAboriginal peoples.
3. Self-government should be implemented by self-government
agreementsbetween governments and FirstNations. Agreements will avoidthe
need for unilateral initiatives by Aboriginal peoples, whichwouldbe bound to
lead to disputes and litigation with unpredictable outcomes. .
4. Self-government agreements should include agreed-upon lists of the
powersthat are suitable andrequiredforgovernance fortheparticular Aboriginal
people . Some powers may be exclusive and others concurrent. Some powers
may be based on a"personal" jurisdiction over a particular Aboriginal people,
others maybe basedon a "territorial"jurisdiction over the Aboriginalpeople's
territory . Emergency jurisdiction may also be needed.
5. Self-government agreements must include transitional provisions for
the application of laws of general application during the start-up period before
an Aboriginal people has enactedthe laws and assumedthe responsibilities that
are contemplated by its agreement .
Government that was elected in 1993 on this platform has not yet (in 1995) taken steps to
implement the inherent right by introducing a national policy. On December 7, 1994, the
Minister ofIndian Affairs concluded a framework agreement with the Chiefs ofManitoba
on thedismantlingoftheDepartment ofIndian Affairs and NorthernDevelopmentandthe
recognition of First Nations governments in that province . While the Framework
Agreement includes generallanguage ontheinherent right and restoration ofjurisdiction,
at the timeofwriting, little progress hasbeen made in implementing the policy objectives .
This Agreement deserves closer analysis once it is clear whether it will guide changes in
Manitoba or be supplanted by a new national policy .
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6. Self-government agreements must include provisions to resolve the
inconsistencies between the laws of the Aboriginal people and the laws of
general application . These provisions would stipulate what kinds of laws took
priority in a situation of conflict .
7. Self-government agreements mayinclude provisions for coordination
between the policies of the Aboriginal people and those of the federal or
provincial (or territorial) governments in fields ofconcurrent jurisdiction . The
administration of justice and taxation are two of the areas where a sharing of
resources and agreement on common policies are likely to be advantageous to
Aboriginal peoples.
8. Self-government agreements should confer jurisdiction on the courts
to settle questions oflaw arising outofthe interpretationor administration ofthe
agreements . Agreements, including a framework agreement, should establish
alternative dispute resolution procedures for resolving disputes on issues of
process and implementation of the right of self-government.
9. Self-government agreements must make secure provision for the
financing of self-government by taxation and transfers from other orders of
government.
10 . Self-government agreements should be constitutionally protected so
that they are not vulnerable to alteration by the unilateral action of the federal
Parliament or a provincial Legislature . This does not require an amendmentof
the Constitution, because a self-government agreement can be a modern treaty
within the protection of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . The federal
government's policy of denying treaty status to self-government agreements
should now be reversed .
11 . Self-governmentagreements, evenifconstitutionally protected, should
still be implementedbyfederal andperhaps provincial (orterritorial) legislation
to make sure that the terms of the agreements are binding on third parties who
were not parties to the agreement.
12. The Charter probably applies to Aboriginal government, but would
probably be interpreted as permitting Aboriginal peoples to pursue culturally-
based policies that are respectful ofindividual rights but which differ from the
practices of federal or provincial governments.
13 . All Aboriginal peoples will have to adopt constitutions setting up the
institutions that will exercise thepowersofself-government. Thoseconstitutions
could include a Charter of Rights that is considered to be appropriate to the
values and aspirations oftheparticular Aboriginal people. Anysuch Aboriginal
Charter would need the support of the Aboriginal people and it could be
interpreted alongside the Canadian Charter, although it would not replace the
Canadian Charter.
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APPEND
EXAMPLEFROM YUKONSELF-GOVERNMENT
AGREEMENTS:
THE TESLIN TLINGIT COUNCIL
SELF-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT
13.0 Legislative Powers
ART
TESLIN TLINGIT COUNCIL LECISLATI
13.1 The Teslin Tlingit Council shall have the exclusive power to enact
laws in relation to the following matters:
13.1 .1 administrationofTeslin Tlingit Council affairs and operation
and internal management of the Teslin Tlingit Council;
13 .1 .2 management and administration of rights or benefits which
are realized pursuant to the Final Agreement by persons
enrolled under the Final Agreement, and which are to be
controlled by the Teslin Tlingit Council; and
13.1.3 matters ancillary to the foregoing.
13.2 The Teslin Tlingit Council shall have the power to enact laws in
relation to the following matters in the Yukon:
13.2 .1 provision of programs and services for Citizens inrelation to
their spiritual and cultural beliefs and practices;
13.2.2 provision of programs and services for Citizens in relation to
their aboriginal languages;
13.2.3 provision of health care and services to Citizens, except
licensing and regulation of facility-based services off
Settlement Land;
13 .2.4 provision of social and welfare services to Citizens, except
licensing and regulation of facility-based services off
Settlement Land;
13.2.5 provision of training programs for Citizens, subject to
Government certification requirements where applicable ;
13 .2 .6 adoption by and of Citizens ;
N
13 .2.7 guardianship, custody, care and placement of Teslin Tlingit
children, except licensing and regulation of facility-based
services off Settlement Land;
13.2.8 provision of education programs and services for Citizens
choosing to participate, except licensing and regulation of
facility-based services off Settlement Land ;
13 .2 .9 inheritance, wills, intestacy and administration of estates of
Citizens, including rights and interests in Settlement Land;
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13.2.10 procedures consistent with theprinciples ofnaturaljusticefor
determining the mental competency or ability of Citizens,
including administration of the rights and interests of those
found incapable of responsibility for their own affairs ;
13.2.11 provision of services to Citizens for resolution of disputes
outside the courts ;
13.2.12 solemnization of marriage of Citizens ;
13.2.13 licences in respect of matters enumerated in 13.1, 13 .2 and
13.3 in order to raise revenue for Teslin Tlingit Council
purposes ;
13 .2.14 matters necessary toenable the Teslin Tlingit Councilto fulfil
its responsibilities under the Final Agreement or this
Agreement; and
13 .2.15 matters ancillary to the foregoing
[Vo1.74
13 .3
	
TheTeslin Tlingit Council shall have the power to enact laws of a
localorprivate natureon SettlementLand inrelation tothe following
matters:
13.3 .1 use, management, administration, control and protection of
Settlement Land ;
13 .3 .2 allocation or disposition of rights and interests in and to
Settlement Land, including expropriation by the TeslinTlingit
Council for Teslin Tlingit Council purposes ;
13.3 .3 use, management, administration and protection of natural
resources under the ownership, control or jurisdiction of the
Teslin Tlingit Council;
13.3 .4 gathering, hunting, trapping or fishing and the protection of
fish, wildlife and habitat;
13.3 .5 control orprohibition f the erection and placement of posters,
advertising signs, and billboards ;
13.3 .6 licensing and regulation of any person or entity carrying on
any business, trade, profession, or other occupation ;
13.3 .7 control or prohibition of public games, sports, races, athletic
contests and other amusements ;
13.3 .8 control ofthe construction, maintenance,repairanddemolition
of buildings or other structures ;
13.3 .9 prevention of overcrowding of residences or other buildings
or structures ;
13.3.10 control of the sanitary condition ofbuildings or property ;
13.3.11 planning, zoning and land development;
13.3.12 curfews, prevention of disorderly conduct and control or
prohibition of nuisances ;
13.3.13 control or prohibition of the operation and use of vehicles ;
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13.3.14 control or prohibition of the transport, sale, exchange,
manufacture, supply, possession orconsumption ofintoxicants;
13.3.15 establishment, maintenance, provision,operationorregulation
of local services and facilities ;
13.3.16 caring and keeping of livestock, poultry, pets and other birds
and animals, and impoundment and disposal of any bird or
animal maltreated or improperly at-large, but the caring and
keeping oflivestock does not include game farming or game
ranching ;
13.3.17 administration of justice;
13.3.18 controlorprohibitionofanyactions, activitiesorundertakings
thatconstituteormayconstitute, athreattopublicorder, peace
or safety;
13 .3.19 control or prohibition of any activities, conditions or
undertakings that constitute, or may constitute, a danger to
public health ;
13.3.20 control or prevention of pollution and protection of the
environment;
13 .3.21 control or prohibition of the possession or use of firearms,
other weapons and explosives ;
13.3.22 controlorprohibitionofthetransport ofdangerous substances ;
and
13 .3.23 matters coming within the good government of Citizens on
Settlement Land .
13.4 .0 Emergency Powers
13 .4.1 Off Settlement Land, in relation to those matters enumerated
in 13.2, in any situation that poses an]Emergency to a Citizen,
GovernmentmayexercisepowerconferredbyLawsofGeneral
Application to relieve the Emergency, notwithstanding that
laws enacted by the Teslin Tlingit Council may apply to the
Emergency.
13.4.2 Aperson actingpursuant to 13.4 .1 shall, as soonaspracticable
after determining that a person in an Emergency is a Citizen,
notify the Teslin Tlingit Council of the action taken and
transfer the matter to the responsible Teslin Tlingit Council
authority, at whichtime the authority oftheGovernmentto act
pursuant to 13 .4 .1 shall cease.
13.4 .3 Aperson actingpursuant to 13.4.1 is notliable for any act done
in goodfaithinthereasonable belief thatthe act was necessary
to relieve an Emergency.
13.4.4 On Settlement Land, in relation to those matters enumerated
in 13.2; in any situation that poses an Emergency to a person
who is not a Citizen, the Teslin Tlingit Council mayexercise
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powerconferred bylawsenacted by theTeslin TlingitCouncil
to relievetheEmergency,notwithstandingthatLaws ofGeneral
Application may apply to the Emergency .
13.4.5 Aperson actingpursuantto 13.4.4 shall, as soonaspracticable
after determining that a person in an Emergency is not a
Citizen, notify Government or, where the person in an
Emergency is a citizen of another Yukon First Nation, that
Yukon First Nation, ofthe actiontaken and transfer the matter
to the responsible authority, at which time the authority ofthe
Teslin Tlingit Council to act pursuant to 13.4.4 shall cease.
13.4 .6 Aperson actingpursuantto 13.4.4 is not liableforany actdone
in goodfaithin the reasonable belief thatthe actwas necessary
to relieve an Emergency.
13.4.7 Notwithstanding 13.5 .0, in relation to powers enumerated in
13.3, Laws of General Application shall apply with respect to
an Emergency arising on Settlement Land which has or is
likely to have an effect off Settlement Land.
13.5.0 Laws ofGeneral Application
13 .5 .1 Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, all Laws of
General Application shall continue to apply to the Teslin
Tlingit Council, its Citizens and Settlement Land .
13.5.2 Canada and the Teslin Tlingit Council shall enter into
negotiations with aview to concluding, as soon aspracticable,
a separate agreement or an amendment of this Agreement
which will identify the areas in which laws of the Teslin
Tlingit Council shall prevail over federal Laws of General
Application to the extent of any inconsistency or conflict.
13 .5 .2 .1 Canada shall Consult with the Yukon prior to
concluding the negotiations described in 13.5 .2 .
13 .5 .2 .2 Clause 13.5.2 shall not affect the status of the Yukon
as a party to the negotiations or agreements referred
to in 13 .6.0 or 17.0 .
13 .5 .3 Except as provided in 14.0, a Yukon Law of General
Application shall be inoperative to the extent that it provides
for any matter for which provision ismade in a law enacted by
the Teslin Tlingit Council.
13 .5 .4 Where the Yukon reasonably foresees that a Yukon Law of
General Application which it intends to enact may have an
impact on a law enacted by the Teslin Tlingit Council, the
Yukon shall Consult with the Teslin Tlingit Council before
introducing the Legislation in the Legislative Assembly .
13 .5 .5 Where the Teslin Tlingit Council reasonably foresees that a
law which it intends to enact may have an impact on aYukon
Law of General Application, the Teslin Tlingit Council shall
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Consult with the Yukon before enacting the law.
13.5 .6 Where the Commissioner in Executive Council is of the
opinion that a law enacted by the Teslin Tlingit Council has
rendered a Yukon Law of General Application partially
inoperative and that it wouldunreasonably alter the character
of a YukonLawofGeneral Application or that itwouldmake
it unduly difficult to administer that Yukon Law of General
Application in relation to the Teslin Tlingit Council, Citizens
or Settlement Land, the Commissioner in Executive Council
may declare that the Yukon Law of General Application
ceases to apply in whole or in part to the Teslin Tlingit
Council, Citizens or Settlement Land.
13 .5.7 Prior to making a declaration pursuant to 13 .5 .6, the Yukon
shall:
13.5 .7 .1 Consult with the Teslin Tlingit Council and identify
solutions, including any amendments to Yukon
Legislation, that theYukon considers wouldmeet the
objectives of the Teslin Tlingit Council; and
13.5 .7.2 after Consultation pursuant to 13.5 .7 .1, where the
Yukon and the Teslin Tlingit Council agree that the
Yukon Law of General Application should be
amended, the Yukon shall propose such amendment
to the Legislative Assembly within a reasonable
period of time .
13.6.0 Administration ofJustice
13.6.1 The Parties shall enter into negotiations with a view to
concluding an agreement in respect of the administration of
Teslin Tlingit Counciljustice provided for in 13.3 .17.
13.6.2 Negotiations respecting the administration of justice shall
deal withsuch mattersas adjudication, civilremedies, punitive
sanctions including fine, penalty and imprisonment for
enforcing any lawofthe Teslin Tlingit Council, prosecution,
corrections, law enforcement, the relation ofany TeslinTlingit
Council courts to other courts and any other matter related to
aboriginal justice to which the Parties agree.
13.6.3 NotwithstandinganythinginthisAgreement, theTeslin Tlingit
Council shall not exercise its powerpursuant to 13.3.17 until
theexpiryofthe time describedin 13.6 .6, unless anagreement
is reached by the Parties pursuant to 13.6.1 and 13.6.2.
13.6.4 Until theexpiry ofthetime describedin 13.6.6or an agreement
is entered into pursuant to 13 .6 .1 and 13.6.2 :
13.6 .4 .1 the Teslin Tlingit Council shall have the power to
establish penalties of fines up to $5,000 and
imprisonment to a maximum of six months for the
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violation of a law enacted by the Teslin Tlingit
Council ;
13.6.4.2 the Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory, the
Territorial Court of Yukon, and the Justice of the
Peace Court shall have jurisdiction throughout the
Yukon to adjudicate in respect oflaws enactedby the
Teslin Tlingit Council in accordance with the
jurisdictiondesignated to thosecourts by YukonLaw
except that any offence created under alaw enacted
by the Teslin Tlingit Council shall be within the
exclusiveoriginal jurisdictionoftheTerritorial Court
ofthe Yukon;
13.6.4 .3 any offence createdunder a law enactedby theTeslin
Tlingit Council shall be prosecuted as an offence
against an enactment pursuant to the Summary
Convictions Act, R.S.Y . 1986, c. 164 by prosecutors
appointed by the Yukon; and
13.6.4 .4 any term ofimprisonment ordered by the Territorial
Court of the Yukon pursuant to 13 .6 .4 .1 shall be
served in a correctional facility pursuant to the
Corrections Act, R.S.Y ., 1986, c. 36 .
13.6 .5 Nothing in 13.6.4 is intended to preclude :
13.6 .5 .1 consensual or existing customary practices of the
Teslin Tlingit Council with respect to the
administration ofjustice; or
13.6 .5 .2 programs and practicesinrespectofthe administration
of justice, including alternate sentencing or other
appropriate remedies, to which the Parties agree
before an agreement is concluded pursuant to 13.6 .1
and 13.6.2 .
13.6 .6 The provisions in 13.6.4 are interim provisions and shall
expire five years from the Effective Date or on the effective
date of the agreement concluded pursuant to 13 .6 .1 and
13.6.2, whichever is earlier. If the Parties fail to reach an
agreement pursuant to 13.6 .1 and 13.6.2 during the five year
period then the interim provisions shall extend for a further
term ending December 31, 1999 .
13.6 .7 All new and incremental costs of implementing the interim
provisions in 13.6.4 incurred by the Yukon shall be paid by
Canada in accordance with guidelines to be negotiatedby the
Yukon and Canada.
